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Is It Better to Go Naked on the Street?
A Primer on the Options Market
Henry F. Johnson*
I. Introduction
Until recently, trading of puts and calls, more commonly termed options,t
were primarily limited to wealthy individuals or to professional traders. 2 One
reason for the failure of the general public to make greater use of stock options
was the mistaken belief that such options were extremely complicated invest-
ment instruments. Many investors felt that there was no real opportunity in
puts and calls unless they had large amounts of investment capital, or had ac-
cess to professional expertise.3 Even the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) seemed to agree. In an early study, the SEC found that writers of puts
and calls were generally individuals or institutions who held large stock port-
folios. 4 Regardless of public opinion, however, and armed with a proper
understanding of the fundamentals, the individual investor may find that op-
tions allow him to enjoy a clear advantage over other investors. In many
specialized investment situations, a proper understanding of options may pro-
vide the investor with a choice of ways in which to invest. 5
II. The Fundamentals of Options Trading
Basically, an option is a right. The option seller grants a right to do
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit. B.A., University of Florida, 1965;J.D., Universi-
ty of Miami, 1977; LL.M., New York University, 1978.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance and suggestions of Miss Susan Freund,
J.D., Creighton University, 1978.
1 At the outset, it must be made clear that "options" in this context mean puts, calls, and combina-
tions of these instruments. Commodity "futures," while resembling options in several respects, are beyond
our scope of discussion.
2 J. CUNNION, How TO GET MAXIMUM LEVERAGE FROM PUTS AND CALLS 2 (1966).
3 Id. at 13.
4 SEC REPORT ON PUT AND CALL OPTIONS (1961) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT].
5 Chicago Board Options Exchange, Understanding Options 28 (1974).
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something, and the option buyer pays money to the seller to receive that right.
The money that changes hands is called the option premium. If the buyer pays
his premium so that he can take something from the seller, the option is termed
a "call." If the buyer's right is to give something to the seller, the option is
called a "put." Additionally, since only a specific amount of money is paid for
the option, the option normally exists only over a limited period of time. If the
buyer chooses not to exercise his right within that time, the option will merely
expire, and the seller will pocket the premium. 6
Originally, options markets were entirely private transactions. The option
writer was usually a man of sophisticated knowledge, who was financially well-
settled, and who wished to increase the yield from his portfolio. If the option
was a call and the stock rose in value, the writer could have the stock "called"
from him at any time during the life of the option. In return, the writer would
be paid the agreed-upon "strike price" 7 plus the option premium. If the writer
already owned the underlying security, he was writing "covered" options. The
buyer of the call secures his profit by calling the stock away from the writer and
reselling the shares at the higher market price. If the stock price declined below
the strike price, the call buyer would simply not exercise his call option because
there would be no profit involved in doing so, as the stock could be purchased
at a lower price on the open market. The writer then kept his stock, now worth
less than before, but had the added premium income to cushion the decline in
the stock.8
If the call writer did not own the underlying security, he might still write
what was termed a "naked" call. 9 In this situation, the writer assumed that the
stock in question would not advance in price, and thus he could simply take the
premium paid as pure profit. However, if the stock involved did advance in
price, the naked call writer was often forced to deliver shares at a highly ap-
preciated price, thus raising the necessity of "covering" at a substantial loss. 10
The operation of a put option was essentially the reverse of the call option.
The put writer would insure his position by selling short the stock on which he
had granted the put. If the stock delined, the writer was obligated to accept the
shares "put" to him at the higher strike price, but his profit from the short sale
would offset his loss on the put contract. If the stock rose, however, this ap-
proach would not result in an enviable position for the put writer. The buyer,
of course, would not exercise the put, for the security continued to bring higher
prices, and the put writer therefore pocketed the option price. But if the writer
had established a short position, he would be faced with the fact that the market
6 J. MILLER, OPTIONS TRADING 2 (1975).
7 The "strike price," also termed the "exercise price," is the price per unit at which the holder of the
option may purchase or sell the underlying security upon exercise. For example, if an investor buys an XYZ
50 April call, the strike price is $50 per share, and the option will expire in April.
8 J. MILLER, supra note 6, at 11-12. See also Prospectus of the Options Clearing Corporation 17, 19
(Oct. 31, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Prospectus]; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Option Writing
Strategies (1975).
9 For a discussion of writing "naked" options, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1978, § F, at 2, col. 3. The
author infers that in bear markets, writing naked calls can result in fairly substantial gains, while at the same
time he cautions potential writers against the extreme risks involved. See also Prospectus, supra note 8, at 20;
Gross, The Negative Option Writer, CoM. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Oct. 12, 1972, at 8.
10 J. MILLER, supra note 6, at 12. See also S. GAYLORD, SENSIBLE SPECULATING WITH PUT AND CALL OP-
TIONS 153-56 (1976).
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would eventually force him to cover at what could turn out to be exceedingly
higher prices. Ia
Perhaps the conservative method of writing puts would be to write naked
puts on stocks the writer himself would not mind owning for his own portfolio.
The cost of buying, even at a higher market price, is usually less of a risk than
the necessity of covering a runaway short position. Strategy would dictate that
the naked put writer would sell the underlying shares short if the price starts
down. Conversely, the covered put writer would place a "stop order" to buy in
his short position if the stock begins to rise.'
2
There are a number of possible uses of options by both writers and buyers.
Each use involves varying degrees of risk, and not every use is suitable for
every investor. Buyers of options generally hope for a favorable change in the
market price of the underlying security, 13 while option writers may profit if the
underlying security does not change or declines in price. Put buyers profit if an
underlying stock declines, 14 while put writers hope for a stabilization or an ac-
tual rise in the price of the underlying security.
III. The Over-the-Counter Options Market and the
Basics of the Business
As interest in options grew, an over-the-counter market (OTC) was
formed. A single option usually covered 100 shares, and the time of the option
before expiration became standardized into 30-day, 60-day, 90-day, 180 +
10-day, and one-year intervals.' 5 The expiration date was set at one of these in-
tervals when the contract was formed.
At about the same time, sale of OTC options was taken over by a trade
group known as the Put and Call Dealer's Association.' 6 This self-regulated
group dealt almost exclusively in options. Each firm acted as a broker to bring
11 See S. GAYLORD, supra note 10, at 159-63; J. MILLER, supra note 6, at 12; Prospectus, supra note 8,
at 21.
12 There are potential problems involved in this method, however. In today's market there are
possibilities for wide and instantaneous price swings in the underlying security, thus negating the "in-
surance" of selling short and placing stop orders. Even though the CBOE has established strict criteria for
the listing of an option by requiring the underlying stock to be a reasonably well-known stable corporation
(see text accompanying note 37 infra), in this day of tender offers and mergers the risk factors cannot be
dismissed lightly.
13 As an example, if an investor purchases an XYZ Oct. 50 option when the market price of the stock is
$50, he is paying for the unexpired time of the option plus the possibility that XYZ's stock will rise in value
during that period. If the stock does rise in value before expiration, then the option is clearly worth more
than the original premium paid. If the original premium was, say, $300, then the option purchaser will
theoretically have a profit when the stock rises above 53 a share, since each option covers 100 shares of the
underlying stock. In point of actual practice, however, the option will continue to be worth $300 plus ap-
preciation, but will be reduced in part if the unexpired term has diminished, all other things being equal.
Thus it can be seen that both time and price volatility affect option values. For a more complete discussion,
see Chicago Board Options Exchange, supra note 5, at 7-10.
14 Essentially, the effect of the put option is the reverse of the call. If the purchase of an XYZ 50 put op-
tion is followed by a decline in price to 40, the option should thus command a premium of about $10 per
share. Had the market price of XYZ been above the exercise price of 50, the option of expiration would have
been worthless.
15 Needless to say, the time intervals were shorter for specialized purposes, or longer in order to relate
to the IRS holding periods for long-term gain. This, however, is now academic due to the changes in tax law
recently enacted. See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
16 H. CLASINO, Dow JONES-IRWIN GUIDE TO PUT AND CALL OPTIoNs 201-02 (1975).
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buyers and sellers together, and income for the dealer resulted from commis-
sions and from any profits derived from an option "inventory" the dealers
maintained in particularly active stocks.
Each option from the Association was guaranteed by a member firm of the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). This was deemed necessary because the
writer was promising to perform an obligation (that is, to buy or to sell 100
shares of stock) at any time during the life of the contract. The member firm
guaranteed that its customer would perform regardless of profitability.
Without this guarantee, the business would deteriorate to the level of a "bucket
shop," and because of the guarantee, brokerage houses usually required high
levels of customer capital to be available before the customer was allowed to
write options.' 7
Generally, the "strike price" is the price of the underlying stock on the
day the contract is entered into. A call where the strike price is below the
underlying stock price, or a put where the strike price is above the stock price,
is called an "in the money" option. A call where the strike price is above the
current stock price, or a put where the strike price is below the stock price, is an
"out of the money" option. If the contract is a "straddle" (one put and one
call on the same stock), the strike price will be the same for each side of the dou-
ble option.' 8
Since options are sold on 100-share lots, the prices of the options are
quoted in points per share. Thus, a 30-day call option on XYZ stock at 100
might be offered at 10 Y2, which means the call would cost the buyer $1,050 for
the entire 100-share option, or $10.50 per share (excluding commissions). Put
options are quoted in the same manner.
An OTC option confers virtually all the benefits of stock ownership on the
holder of the option. If the stock were to be split, the option would be modified
appropriately. If a dividend were paid on optioned stock, the strike price would
be reduced by the amount of the dividend. 9 For the holder of a call, the effect
was to give the dividend to the option holder, but only in the event that the
holder exercised the option.
IV. The Chicago Board Options Exchange
While trading in options was becoming a booming business, the primary
problem with the OTC option market was the lack of any potential resale. The
holder of a profitable option had only two alternatives: either exercise the op-
tion or lock in the profit by trading against the option.20 However, additional
cash was required to finance either of these operations, and double commission
costs had to be paid. Conversely, an unprofitable option could almost never be
17 Id. See also R.R. NATHAN ASSOCIATES, INC., PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF A FUTURES TYPE MARKET IN
OPTIONS AND SECURITIES, Section on Endorsements and Margin Requirements (1969) [hereinafter cited as
1969 NATHAN STUDY].
18 The use of straddles and other devices is discussed in the text accompanying notes 42-50 infra.
19 J. MILLER, supra note 6, at 16-17. See also SEC REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
20 Note that exercise of a profitable call option was known in the brokerage trade as a "riskless"
transaction. This was because the simultaneous exercise of the option and sale of the underlying stock
resulted in an immediate generation of both commissions and cash, with no risk on either part of the
transaction resulting in a default.
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resold to another buyer, even if the time period remaining before expiration
was great. 2'
To alleviate this problem, on April 26, 1973, the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE) began trading in call options. The OBOE, sponsored by the
Chicago Board of Trade, totally revolutionized the option business. During its
first year, the CBOE traded over two million call options, with steadily increas-
ing volume.2 2 In direct contrast, new options issued by the members of the Put
and Call Brokers Association dwindled during the same period to fewer than
two thousand contracts per week. 23 Additionally, with the success of the listed
option market, the number of underlying stocks on which options are traded
also increased rapidly, and today there are several hundred issues listed on five
different options exchanges.2 4
The CBOE introduced several important innovations. First, the expira-
tion dates and exercise prices of exchange traded options were standardized.
Trading is generally opened in options having four fixed expiration dates:
January, April, July, and October.2 5 In additon, trading of options of a par-
ticular expiration month usually begins nine months prior, so that on any given
date, options with three different expiration dates are available. When a new
expiration month is added, the exercise price is usually fixed at a dollar figure
most closely approximating the market price of the underlying stock. While the
option is actively traded, the only remaining variable is the premium, and it is
determined by an auction market process.2 6 The premium for an option is a
function of the estimated profit potential over the life of the option, taking risk
into consideration. The more the option is in the money, the greater is its in-
trinsic value. Similarly, the more valuable the option is, the greater is its cost.
Of course, the longer an option has to run, the greater the possibility of profit,
and therefore, the premium paid usually increases with longer exercise
periods.2 7
Another crucial innovation of the CBOE is that of severing the contractual
relationship between the individual buyer and the individual seller. The Op-
tion Clearing Corporation (OCC)28 is now the primary obligor on every option
contract. When an option is exercised, the OCC assigns an exercise notice to
the writer's clearing member, selected at random, and the latter is obligated to
deliver the underlying stock against payment of the exercise price. These in-
novations permit a continuous secondary market in which option holders may
sell their options before expiration at current market prices, and in which op-
21 See 1969 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 17, Section on Absence of a Resale Market; see alsoJ. MILLER,
supra note 6, at 53.
22 P. SARNOFF, The CBOE: The First Year, Herzog & Co. Release (April 26, 1974).
23 Id. Note that as of this writing, the OTC Options Market has ceased operations entirely.
24 Besides the OBOE, put and call options are also traded on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, and the Midwest Stock Exchange.
25 As per the most recent OCC Prospectus, other expiration month cycles are now also available. See
Prospectus, supra note 8, at 6-7.
26 Prospectus, supra note 8, at 14-15.
27 SeeJ. MILLER, supra note 6, at 53-58. See also THE MERRILL LYNCH GUIDE TO BUYINC PUTS AND CALLS
14 (1973).
28 Organized in 1972 under Delaware Law, the OCC was a wholly owned subsidiary of the CBOE until
Jan. 3, 1975, when the AMEX purchased a 50%interest.
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tion buyers and writers may "close out" or "buy back" their obligations. 29
For example, a buyer of an option on an XYZ July 50 call who paid 6 might
find that several weeks later the underlying stock has risen and XYZ July 50
calls are selling at 9. Presented with this situation, the holder could realize the
$300 gain in the call price in a closing sale transaction. The holder of a put op-
tion might similarly realize, in a closing sale transaction, any gain in the put
price resulting from a decline in the market price of the underlying security.
Accordingly, writers may similarly terminate their delivery obligations by
entering into such a closing sale transaction. In writing situations, the writer
buys an option on the same security as the option he previously wrote, and the
buy position has the effect of cancelling the writer's prior obligation.3 0 The
ready liquidity resulting from the OCC is the primary reason for the popularity
of the CBOE.3 1
Liquidity is perhaps the prime objective of the CBOE. 32 To guarantee this
liquidity, the CBOE system employs a board broker who handles customer
orders, and who is, in some ways, similar to the specialist on the floor of the
NYSE.33 The board broker buys and sells only for his customer's accounts, and
cannot deal for himself at all. While there are also "market makers" on the
CBOE floor, the board broker's trade' price takes priority. Thus, within the
CBOE, there will always be an "aftermarket" in which option buyers and
writers can deal in order to realize profits on appreciated options. Of course,
option holders can also allow their options to expire unexercised, or they can
elect to take delivery of the underlying stock, as was the normal course of
events in the now defunct OTO market. 34
There are several other features of the CBOE worthy of mention. The
concept of "certificateless trading" has been initiated, in order to eliminate the
need for issuance of option certificates. The only evidence of the option
transaction is the broker's confirmation, although customers may obtain
documentary evidence of option ownership for a small charge.35 Additionally,
on the CBOE market the buyer takes delivery of stock free from any dividends
declared during the life of the option, but only in the event that the option is ex-
ercised. 36 And, the OCC rules permit CBOE options to be traded only on
widely held stocks which meet strict listing, reporting, and disclosure re-
quirements, insuring that the corporate issuer of the underlying security has a
reasonably stable business history.3 7 The combination of liquidity, fungibility,
29 See Prospectus, supra note 8, at 25-28; See also Note, Exchange Traded Stock Options: Investment Techniques
and Tax Strategy, 44 U. C(IN. L. REv. 753, 757 (1975).
30 See Prospectus, supra note 8, at 26-27; H. CLASING, supra note 16, at 10-11.
31 Soll, The Income Tax Ramifications of Securities Options, 5 TAx ADvisoR 484 (1974).
32 See 1969 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 17.
33 A "specialist" is a member of the NYSE who assumes several specific responsibilities. First, he is
charged with maintaining an orderly market in the stocks in which he is registered; he must be prepared to
buy and sell for his own account in order to maintain such a market. Second, he acts as a "broker's broker,"
who will receive orders from commission brokers and try to execute them in the market if possible. At all
times, the specialist must put his customer's interests above his own. Note, however, that at the present time
the role of the specialist is undergoing fundamental changes.
34 See Prospectus, supra note 8, at 28-36.
35 Id. at 11-12.
36 Id. at 30-31.
37 Id. at 12-14. Note that although the 000 rules require certain business history and disclosure
documents, the volatility of the security is not an important consideration for listing. Additionally, certain of
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and the secondary market, along with significant changes from the OTC con-
cepts, contributed to the growth and success of options trading on the CBOE.38
V. Option Trading-Basic Investment Strategy
Within the last few years, the CBOE has elevated investment in common
stocks to a new level of sophistication. For the uninitiated, experimentation
with exchange traded options involves peculiar and substantial risks, but for
the imaginative and well-informed investor, options are a potentially safe,
profitable form of investment where risk can be tailored to financial situations
and personal investment objectives. 39
Most option buyers purchase options in the hope of increasing their
leverage when they anticipate a significant move in the underlying stock, or
when they wish to limit their risk on an investment. Option writers expect to
generate additional income from their investment portfolios, although giving
up certain rights in return for this additional income. Thus, the writer of a
covered call gives up the right to participate in any appreciation of the underly-
ing stock beyond a price equal to the striking price of the option plus the call
premium. 40
The cost of a call is significantly lower than the cost of buying the underly-
ing security. Therefore, a given amount of funds may purchase calls covering
larger quantities of the security than a buyer could purchase directly. Compare
two investors, one who purchases a call and one who purchases the underlying
stock. The call buyer invests $500 for a call on 100 shares of XYZ at 50 per
share. The stock buyer invests $5,000 for 100 shares of stock. Both investors, of
course, expect a rise in the value of the stock to occur. If the stock rises to 60,
the call buyer can exercise or resell his call for $1,000, a gain of $500 on his in-
vestment. The buyer of the stock can resell for $6,000, a gain of $1,000. The
call buyer has realized a 100% gain on his investment, but the stock buyer has
only a 20% gain. Hence, a call generates significantly greater leverage. Should
the stock decline, however, leverage works in the other direction. The stock
buyer will suffer a $1,000 loss on his investment if the stock slides to 40, but the
call buyer has lost his entire investment. However, the $500 lost by the call
buyer is still less in dollars than the loss suffered by the stock buyer, and it may
be that this limitation on loss (that is, the maximum loss on calls is limited to
the cost of the call) is all that the call buyer expected in the first place. 41 Note,
the exchanges are currently proposing that OTC securities be approved as underlying securities for option
trading, subject to SEC and OCC approval.
38 See The New Thrust in Call Options, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 11, 1973, at 90. Also note that the foregoing
discussion is by no means an exhaustive explanation of options or the OCC. For a more complete
understanding, see Prospectus, supra note 8; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Constitution and Rules
(1974).
39 See Note, supra note 29. The general idea that option trading is "practically safe," however, is well
rebuffed in several texts and articles, as well as the CBOE Prospectus itself.
40 G. GASTINEAU, THE STOCK OPTIONS MANUAL 70-74 (1975).
41 Note that there are ways to hedge this situation as discussed in the text accompanying notes 43-50 in-
fa. Also note that in this and all ensuing examples transaction costs (commissions) are not considered. The
examples given, and many other situations and strategies, may be explained further in many of the books
and articles already cited in this article, and in numerous other pamphlets and publications.
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however, that the call buyer has to predict not only that the price of the
underlying security will rise, but that it will rise within the time span of the op-
tion. The stock buyer, on the other hand, has only a paper loss which is
unrealized unless he sells the stock.
The common use of a put option purchase is to cover an anticipated
decline in the price of the underlying security. If the put buyer has stock
originally acquired at 25 per share but is now worth 50 per share as the result of
a sharply rising market, the stockholder may decide to protect his gain by pur-
chasing a put option on XYZ at 50. In such a case, he has guaranteed a price of
50 for his shares over the life of the put. Of course, this gain on exercise will be
reduced by the premium paid for the put.
If the put buyer does not own the underlying security, but believes the
market will decline, he may nonetheless participate in such a market decline by
purchasing puts. The advantage to the put buyer who is essentially a short
seller in this situation, is that he is not subject to margin calls, as is the short
seller. However, the put buyer will lose his entire investment if the market
price does not decline as expected.
Both the writer of a call and the writer of a put hope to realize premium in-
come. The writer of a covered call (that is, a situation where the writer owns
the underlying security) gives up any opportunity for profit from a price in-
crease in return for the premium paid. He has, however, retained the risk of
loss should the price of the security decline, but his loss is lessened by the
amount of premium income received. An uncovered call writer also reaps
premium income, but he hopes to do so without the necessity of committing ad-
ditional capital. Should the price of the underlying security rise, however, the
writer of "naked" calls stands to incur substantial losses until he "covers,"
either by purchasing the security in the market or by purchasing a call in a clos-
ing sale transaction.
The put writer is in a similar position. Usually the writer will sell the
underlying security short and write his put on that same security. Although the
investor may incur a loss on his put writing position if the price of the underly-
ing security falls, his loss may be offset by the profit realized in the related short
position. If the investor writes an XYZ 50 put and receives a premium of $500,
he may also sell XYZ short and realize $5,000 from the short sale. If XYZ falls
to 40, the investor may have to purchase XYZ at 50 pursuant to an exercise of
his put, or he may close out his put position by entering into a closing transac-
tion. In either event, his loss of $1,000 would be offset by premium income of
$500, for a net loss on the put position of $500, but he makes a $1,000 gain on
his short position, giving him a net gain of $500 on the "covered" transaction.
Note, however, that a short position presents extreme risk, for if the underlying
security rises, the loss on the short position may be astronomical, and will only
be offset by the amount of premium income received. Accordingly, put writing
is a more complex transaction and should not be entered into except by
knowledgeable investors.
VI. Option Trading-Sophisticated Strategies
The ordinary investor who might consider option trading will often have
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difficulty understanding arbitrage or hedging. The concept of arbitrage is to
seek profit through price disparities that exist simultaneously between the same
or related securities in the same or different markets. Hedging is simply the ef-
fect of counterbalancing a sale or purchase of one security by making a pur-
chase or sale of another.4 2 The basic hedge, that of buying a stock and writing a
call against that stock, has already been considered. Some more sophisticated
investing techniques will be considered in this section. 43
Perhaps the simplest advanced strategy available to the option writer is
that of "variable hedging." In a variable hedge, the investor writes several
calls on the same security, thus giving him additional premium income in order
to provide additional downside protection. The investor usually begins by
writing one covered call and, if the price of the security declines, writes an ad-
ditional naked call. If the call writer buys 100 shares of the stock and sells calls
on 200 shares, the result is that the owner-writer is protected from loss in rela-
tionship to the amount of premiums received. For example, if the investor
owns 100 shares of XYZ and sells two calls with a 50 exercise price and a $5,
premium, the premium income is equal to $10 for each share owned. Thus, the
price must decline to below 40 before the investor will incur a loss. Should the
price of the stock increase, for instance to 60 a share, the investor will deliver
his 100 covered shares; and will deliver another 100 shares bought on the
market, incurring a $10 per share loss. Thus, he breaks even on the entire
transaction. If there is an increase of less than $10 in the stock price, he has a
net profit. Note that with the CBOE, the investor may not have to deliver, but
may "buy in" his earlier option as the stock price rises, thus insuring a profit.
A variation on the variable hedge is the "step-up" or "step-down" op-
tion. If the investor owns 100 shares, he may write an XYZ 50 call option,
earning a $5 premium. If the stock declines to 45, the investor "buys in" the
option, at a lower price since the stock has declined, and thus has a small profit
on the transaction. He then writes a new option with a 45 exercise price, again
receiving a premium of $5. If the profit on the first option was $2, with the new
$5 premium the investor has $7 worth of downside protection. If the stock con-
tinues to decline, the "step-down" may be repeated again, thus earning addi-
tional premium income. In addition, since there is no uncovered option at any
time, the risks of writing naked are eliminated. The "step-up" hedge is ac-
complished in a similar manner, with the result that premium income will
again always exceed "buy in" costs. While in both cases the change in price in
the underlying security will result in a loss, the premium income will, if the
hedge is properly executed, exceed the loss. And, if the stock is one the investor
wishes to hold, there is only a paper loss that is unrealized.
One of the oldest forms of hedging is the "straddle," which consists of
selling a call and a put at the same time, on the same stock, for the same strike
price. As with other options, the straddle can be either covered or naked. If an
investor writes a naked straddle on a stock that sells for 100, he can receive, for
42 For a further explanation of this and other investment terms, see the pamphlets issued by the OBOE,
supra notes 5, 8.
43 Again, note that the sophisticated strategies discussed herein are discussed in numerous books and
pamphlets. The interested investor is invited to sample such strategies by referring to the previously cited
materials.
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example, a call premium of 10 and a put premium of 5. If at expiration the
stock is 110 or higher, the writer loses on the call, but has additional $5
premium on the put, which means the straddle writer can make a profit unless
the stock goes to 115 or higher. On the down side, if the stock falls below 100
the put will be exercised, but the price would have to decline below 95 before
loss on the put would exist due to the $5 premium. However, since the writer
also sold a call at $10 which will not be exercised, the stock must fall to below
85 before the investor will incur a net loss.
While straddle writing thus increases the range of prices between which
the writer will make a profit, should the price rise or fall beyond the $15 in
either direction the writer is liable for loss. However, with the CBOE after-
market, the investor can "buy in" in the side of the option likely to incur the
loss, and thus again insure a potential gain.
If the investor writes a covered straddle, he protects himself against price
increases. He will then make a profit on the upside no matter how high the
price may rise on the underlying stock, the gain being the premium received.
On the downside, however, he loses for each point the stock falls below 100,
and in addition loses on the put."4 Hence, he loses two points for each point the
stock drops. Since our covered writer realized a total of $15 in premiums, he is
only covered on the downside to 92 2 due to the double risk on the loss side.
Again, however, the sophisticated option trader would attempt to insure his
position by covering his losing option in a closing sale transaction.
A variation on the straddle is the "spread." This device involves the sale
of a calf and a put on the same stock but with different strike prices. On a naked
spread, with a stock selling at 100, an investor might sell a put with a strike
price of 90 and a call with a strike price of 110. Although the premium income
would be less than those received on a straddle, the spread writer makes his full
profit if the stock finishes anywhere between the strike prices. If the spread
writer receives, for example, a total of $7 in premiums, he makes a profit if the
stock finishes between 83 and 117, although the profit is less than the full
amount of the premium. To clarify this, neither the put nor the call would be
exercised if the stock finished between 90 and 110, giving the writer the entire
premium as profit; however, if the stock declined to 85, the writer would have
to cover the put at 90 for a loss of $5, but would offset the loss with the
premium income of $7, for a total $2 per share gain.
The covered spread writer, who owns 100 shares of the stock, protects
himself from any price rise. As his call strike price is 110, he will keep his
premiums and his stock if the stock finishes between 100 and 110. If the stock
finishes above 110, the investor's profit will be fixed at $17, the total of a
10-point rise in the owned stock (which was at 110 when the spread was writ-
ten), plus the entire $7 in premiums. If the stock declines, however, the spread
writer loses $1 a point down to 90, but when the put becomes exercisable the
writer will lose 2 points for every point the stock declines. 45
44 Assuming our investor bought XYZ at 100, every point below 100 results in a loss on the stock posi-
tion in addition to the loss on the put. Thus the maximum profit is limited to the premiums paid, but the
potential loss is much greater.
45 There are numerous variations on spreads. See S. GAYLORD, supra note 10, at 130-48; Snyder, CBOE
Spreading Strategies (1974).
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Perhaps a final example of the sophisticated hedge might well be a com-
bination strategy involving convertible securities and options. The convertible
security is a hybrid security that displays both debt and equity characteristics. 46
The holder of the convertible may exchange his bond for a fixed number of
shares at any time or, alternatively, he may hold the bond, collect the semi-
annual interest, and recover his principal at maturity. Thus the bond, in effect,
constitutes a call on the underlying stock, while at the same time the investor
has the option to sell the underlying stock (equivalent to a put) for the market
value of the bond during the life of the bond, or at face value at maturity. The
bond will act as a stock in the event the underlying stock rises, while it will be
protected from severe decline by the amount of its interest payment. 47
With these elements in mind, it is apparent that such bonds may be used
in connection with option strategies. One potential strategy would be to buy
such bonds and also to buy puts. 48 If the common declines, the put becomes
valuable and may be sold for gain. The loss on the convertible would be limited
by its interest payment (that is, the bond will decline to a point equivalent to its
so-called investment value, which is approximately equal to the value of non-
convertible bonds with similar maturities and interest rates). This loss will
often be less than the gain on the put. On the other hand, should the stock in-
crease in value, there will be a loss on the put, but the gain on the bond may
more than offset the loss of the put premium.
Another convertible strategy is to sell the convertible short and buy calls.
49
If the price increases, the call becomes valuable; if the common price falls, the
short position becomes valuable. This, clearly, is effectively the reverse of the
earlier situation.
Perhaps the best convertible strategy is to write calls against convertible
bonds. By substituting the convertible for the common stock, there is still a ful-
ly covered position, and a conservative hedge is established. Income is
generated not only by premium income in this instance, however, but also by
the interest paid on the bond. Thus, the total income return is already greater
than if the call were covered by common stock. If the stock price remains un-
changed, the call will expire and a new call can be written. If the price goes up,
the loss on the common is offset by the gain in the convertible. If the price goes
down, the call will expire unexercised. If the stock rises and the call will be ex-
ercised, the convertible writer has several alternatives. He may convert and
deliver the underlying stock; he may sell short against the convertible to obtain
the shares; he may sell the bond and buy the common in the market; or he may
simply buy the stock and deliver, and at the same time write a new call to offset
his delivery costs. In any event, he will be fully covered and should not incur
any loss unless he is careless in his execution.
46 For purposes of this section, we will deal with convertible bonds, and omit discussion of convertible
preferred stock. The basic differences between the two are immaterial for purposes of this discussion, except
that the convertible stock has no maturity date.
47 In the event of decline, the convertible bond will, in theory, act much like a "straight" bond, and
will act in the market as a function of its interest and maturity dates. Two bonds with similar interest rates
and maturity dates will trade at similar prices, all other things being equal. If the interest rate is sufficiently
high, the bond will theoretically be limited in its decline.
48 To implement these bond strategies, bonds should be purchased at or below par.
49 In this instance, the bond should be bought while selling at a premium.
[Vol. 55:71 OPTIONS
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
These so-called sophisticated strategies are not a complete catalog of
possibilities.50 An intelligent investor can probably think of numerous others.
Those investors considering option trading should seek knowledgeable
assistance and analyze potential benefits and possible risks before proceeding.
VII. The Taxation of Options
Clearly, options on securities may be utilized as a conservatively oriented
investment tool in some investment strategies, with the overall result of im-
proving the income yield from portfolios while providing some protection from
volatile market swings. 5 t As in any investment, however, there are tax conse-
quences to be considered, and in this section we will look at some (but not all)
such consequences.
Prior to the advent of exchange traded options, the mere receipt of a
premium by the s6ller (writer) of either a put or a call did not result in recogni-
tion of income. Such recognition was deferred until the option expired, ter-
minated, or was exercised. When the option expired unexercised, the amount
of the premium received by the seller constituted ordinary income, and was in-
cludible in gross income for the year in which the option expired. 52 The sale by
an option investor (buyer) of either a put or call option resulted in short-term or
long-term capital gain or loss treatment, depending on the holding period of
the option.5 3 Additionally, if the put or call option expired unexercised while in
the hands of an investor, the option was considered to have been sold or ex-
changed on the day of expiration, and capital losses resulted as if the option
had been sold.
54
Subsequent to the trading of exchange-listed options, but prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 55 tax treatment of listed options rested largely on the
strength of two private letter rulings issued to the CBOE in which the Service
interpreted the application of sections 1233 (short sales) and 1234 (options to
buy or sell) to options trading.56 These private rulings, in essence, concluded
that options were capital assets in the hands of their holders, and that the
underlying securities involved were also capital assets in the hands of options
writers.
The private rulings, however, led to several loopholes. In a OBOE closing
transaction, the writer of an option cancels his outstanding obligation to deliver
50 See also strips, straps, butterfly spreads, and other such esoteric devices. The interested reader
should see H. FILER, UNDERSTANDING PUT AND CALL OPTIONS (1966); Colgan, Puts, Calls, and Other Options,
27 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1157 (1969).
51 See generally Turov, Irresistable Call-Options Trading on the Amex off to a Brisk Start, Barron's, Feb. 10,
1975, at 11.
52 See Rev. Rul. 72-198, 1972-1 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
53 I.R.C. § 1234(a), prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976; Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B.
279.
54 I.R.C. § 1234(b), prior to amendment by Tax Reform Act of 1976; Rev. Rul. 71-521, 1971-2 C.B.
313. See also Estes, Federal Income Tax Advantages to Investors in the Use of Put and Call Options, 31 TAX L. REV. 1
(1975).
55 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
56 See Special Rulings of Sept. 7, 1973, and April 8, 1974, reprinted in [1979] 7 FED. INC. TAX REP.
(CCH) 4742.14. While generally individual taxpayers cannot rely on private rulings issued by the Service,
tax counsel to the Options Clearing Corporation stated that, in its opinion, the tax consequences set forth in
the rulings would apply to all holders and writers of exchange-traded options.
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by purchasing an option with identical terms to that of the previously written
option. The difference between the amount paid in the closing transaction and
the premium that was originally received by the writer constituted ordinary in-
come or loss. 5 7 Thus, prior to 1976, such options transactions resulted in or-
dinary gains or losses, while related transactions in the underlying security
usually received capital treatment. Taxpayers were able, therefore, to
recognize ordinary losses and capital gains, or ordinary gains and capital
losses, from the same series of transactions. 5 8
The Tax Reform Act, signed into law on October 4, 1976, changed the or-
dinary income and loss treatment of options writers to capital gain and loss
treatment. The bill became effective for options written after September 1,
1976, and essentially directs that options buyers and writers should be given
similar tax treatment.
The "new" section 1234 provides for gains or losses from closing transac-
tions on "property" to be considered as capital gains or losses, and gains on
expirations of options are to be treated as short-term capital transactions as
well. 59 The new law thus makes it irrelevant whether the writer's underlying
position is a capital asset or not, whether it was held long-term or not, and
whether in fact there was a sale or exchange, since anything but an exercise is
to be treated as a sale or exchange of a short-term capital asset. 60 Tax planning
is rendered much less crucial with the current treatment. The investor can no
longer sustain ordinary losses from options, but it is still possible to generate
long-term capital gains from underlying long positions. If a call is exercised,
the holding period of the underlying stock determines whether the resulting
gain is short- or long-term. 6 1 Generally, however, for options written after
September 1, 1976, short-term treatment results, irrespective of the length of
time of the option or whether the option was a put, a call, or some combination
of the two. 62
The present tax treatment of options is best explained by example. The
termination of a writing (selling) position, through either a lapse or a closing
purchase transaction, will result in a short-term capital gain or loss, although if
57 See Treas. Reg. 5 1.1234-1(b), prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which held that any gain to the
writer was ordinary income.
58 The effect of this anomaly is presented in H.R. RP. No. 1192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976):
Assume, for example, that a taxpayer in the 50 percent tax bracket purchases 100 shares of IBM
for $200 per share; he also writes a call on the stock at a striking price of $200 per share, for a
premium of $2,500. If the value of the stock rises to $250 per share, and the taxpayer has held his
stock for more than six months, he may sell the stock, realizing a long-term capital gain of $5,000
on which he owes $1,250 tax. He also enters a dosing transaction with respect to his call by
purchasing a call on IBM at a striking price of $200 per share; he would pay a premium of about
$5,000 under these circumstances, and the resulting loss of $2,500 (determined by subtracting the
premium the taxpayer received for the call he wrote from the premium he paid for the call he
purchased) would be ordinary loss which could be offset against ordinary income for a tax saving
of $1,250. The net result is that the taxpayer pays no tax on transactions producing a net economic
income of $2,500.
59 See I.R.C. S 1234(b)(1). "Property" is defined under S 1234 (b)(2)(B) as "stocks and securities (in-
cluding stocks and securities dealt with on a 'when issued' basis), commodities, and commodity futures."
60 See Auster, The Erratic Histoty of the Taxation of Option Writers With Special Rference to the Straddle, 2 REv.
TAX. INDIVIDUALs 333 (1978).
61 Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
62 Note, however, that the tax treatment discussed herein applies to individual investors only.
"Dealers" in options are subject to other rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. S 1234(b)(3); Treas. Reg. 1.471-5 (1958);
Reinach v. Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1605 (1965), aft'd, 373 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1967).
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the option is exercised, the entire transaction is treated as a purchase or sale of
the underlying stock. 63 The premium, on exercise, is added to the cost of the
stock, so if a call is involved, the premium increases the amount realized by the
writer on the sale of the stock. Therefore, a call writer must elect either a clos-
ing purchase transaction or exercise.
Assume that an options investor buys 100 shares of XYZ Corporation in
January at $100 per share, and then writes an XYZ April 90 call, which gives
him a premium of $15. If, in April, the stock is selling for 95 and the call is sell-
ing at 6, the results of a closing purchase transaction may be more advan-
tageous to the writer than awaiting exercise. The advantage obtains because
the closing purchase transaction would result in a $900 short-term gain, com-
puted by subtracting the closing premium from the original premium received,
while an exercise of the option would result in a short-term gain of only $500.
The exercise gain is computed by finding, first, the total proceeds received on
exercise (the exercise price plus the option premium received), and then sub-
tracting the cost of the stock. 6. Of course, had the stock moved below the strike
price, the call writer would have realized a short-term gain on the option of the
entire premium, or $1,500, which would be offset by an unrealized loss in the
underlying stock. Similar computation methods are used to determine the gain
or loss to option buyers and to writers of puts.
65
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1976 substantially clarified many of the
existing problems in the taxation of options, some additional problems still re-
main. For example, under section 1091 of the Internal Revenue Code, a loss
on a sale of securities is deferred if the seller purchases "substantially
identical" securities or acquires a call option covering such securities within a
period beginning 30 days prior to and ending 30 days after the sale of a securi-
ty. 66 This so-called "wash sale" rule effectively denies deductions on any losses
sustained on the sale of stock if a call option on the same stock is acquired
within the established time period of the rule. 67 Problems may also arise in the
63 See Rev. Rul. 58-234, 1958-1 C.B. 279.
64 This computation may be more readily seen in the following fashion:
A. Closing Purchase
Opening Premium $1,500
Closing Premium - 600
Short-term Gain $ 900
B. Exercise
Proceeds of Exercise
Exercise Price $ 9,000
Premium Received 1,500
Total $10,500
Cost of Stock - 10,000
Short-term Gain $ 500
65 For a more complete discussion, see the informative booklets produced by the CBOE and the AMEX
concerning tax planning for options investors. These publications may be obtained without charge from any
NYSE member firm and any firm dealing in CBOE and AMEX options. See also Prospectus, supra note 8, at
19.
66 I.R.C. 5 1091; Treas. Reg. § 1.1091-1(a) (1956).
67 Note, however, that if the call is exercised, the basis of the acquired stock will be the basis of the
underlying stock previously sold adjusted for the exercise price of the call plus the premium paid for the call.
The holding period for the acquired stock under a "wash sale" violation will include the period the previous
underlying stock was held, but there will be no "tacking" of the holding period of the call. I.R.C. § 1091(d);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1091-1.
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area of short sales. In general, if an underlying stock is held short-term and a
put is purchased, the holding period of that stock does not begin to run until the
disposition of the put. 68 In effect, therefore, all gains in such instances are
short-term in nature. If an investor purchases stock and then buys a put within
one year, a sale of the stock after a holding period of, say, 14 months would still
result in short-term gain. If the stock had been held after the disposition of the
put, the holding period would only begin to run from the date of the puts'
disposition, and any earlier holding period disappears entirely.6 9 Note,
however, an exception to this general rule: if a put is acquired the same day as
the underlying stock, and the underlying security is identified as stock which
will be tendered if the put is exercised, then "normal" tax rules (that is, those
previously discussed) will apply. 70 Alternatively, if such a put is exercised with
other than the identified stock, the short sale rules will apply. Additionally, if
the put lapses without exercise, the cost of the put will be added to the tax basis
of the identified underlying stock. 71
Despite these (and other) problems, 72 some combinations of options and
transactions in underlying securities can result in tax advantages, principally
through a deferral of taxation. An investor with a profitable call, for example,
could hedge his profit by making a short sale of the underlying security while
deferring taxes to a future taxable year. Similar results could be obtained by
purchasing a put to "lock-in" the gain on a profitable long position in the
underlying stock while concurrently maintaining the stock itself for upside ap-
preciation potential. Thus, with proper tax planning, investors may use op-
tions to "time" their tax liability, which may effectively defer such liability to a
more favorable taxable year.
VIII. The "Prudent Man Rule" as an Obstacle: Fiduciaries
A proper understanding of the role of options in fiduciary investment pro-
grams calls for the realization that the ultimate aim of the typical trust is to pro-
vide a reasonable income for the life tenant and to preserve the trust principal
for. the remainderman. 73 The trustee, who must fulfill these goals, must
therefore try to invest so as to obtain maximum return with the least risk. 74
Fiduciaries, executors, trustees, or professional managers are under a duty to
68 I.R.C. S 1233(b)(2). Recall from our earlier discussions that a put is essentially equivalent to a short
sale.
69 See Treas. Reg. 9 1.1233-1(c)(2) (1956); Rev. Rul. 58-384, 1958-2 C.B. 410. The revenue ruling also
states that a call option is not to be considered equivalent to the underlying stock for purposes of the short
sale rules.
70 I.R.C. § 1233(c).
71 Treas. Reg. 1.1233-1(c)(3) (1956).
72 Other areas where problems might arise include: different tax treatment for different "legs" in a
"spread"; the tax treatment accorded personal holding companies; nonresident alien taxes; and taxation of
options transactions by Tax-Exempt Organizations, Regulated Investment Companies, Subchapter S Cor-
porations, and Pension Trustees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. S
1001 (1976).
73 Note, Trust Fund Investment in New York: The Prudent Man Rule and Diversification of Investments, 47
N.Y.U.L. REv. 527 (1972).
74 See McSwain, The Prudent Man Rule, 106 TRUSTS & EsTs. 742 (1967). See also In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y.
246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951).
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employ profitably the funds in their hands under penalty of personal liability
for their neglect.
75
The overriding source of fiduciary liability in dealing with trust assets
stems from the well-known "Prudent Man Rule," first articulated in Harvard
College v. Amory 76 in 1830. In general, the rule required only that the trustee ex-
ercise "prudent discretion" in the selection of investments with the provision
that the rights of the life tenant and the remainderman be preserved. 77 Clearly,
as originally written, trustees had a wide choice of investments under the Har-
vard College standard.
Over the years, however, several jurisdictions have adopted quite dif-
ferent versions of what they conceive as the Prudent Man Rule, 78 and some
states have adopted "legal lists," which limit a fiduciary's choice of investment
to pre-screened, specified issues. 7 9 In selecting legal lists, legislatures have
specified certain investments as "proper" for the investment of trust funds,
and by so doing have afforded some measure of protection for fiduciaries. But
neither the Prudent Man Rule nor the legal lists excuse the fiduciary in case of
loss where he invests in securities of the permitted classes without proper in-
vestigation and the exercise of reasonable care. 80 The ever-present danger of
personal liability requires the average intelligent prudent man to be extremely
careful in the selection of the investments which will best suit his objectives,
whether he is located in a legal list state or one which permits him to make in-
vestments using "reasonable care and skill. ',81
The problem, of course, is how to define "prudent" in today's
sophisticated investment environment. The field of investments has changed so
drastically that it has left its legal environment miles behind; even with
numerous restatements and interpretations, the Prudent Man Rule remains a
vague, misunderstood law. 82 Some authorities believe minimizing losses is
especially important, and stress diversification in investments, 83 while others
feel that overconcentration on losses may lead to imprudent investment deci-
sions. 84 However, because trust investments are to be examined individually if
the trustee's prudence is challenged,8 5 no fixed approach appears certain to in-
sulate a fiduciary from potential liability.
If potential liability is the watchword, what treatment is to be afforded the
professional investor-trustee who wishes to invest in options? The original pru-
dent man approach in Harvard College v. Amo y8 appears to give the trustee the
75 302 N.Y. at 255, 97 N.E.2d at 892. See generally Committee on Investments by Fiduciaries, Investments
by Personal Representatives, 8 REAL PROP., PROB., & TR. J. 465 (1973).
76 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
77 Id. at 461.
78 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE S 2261(1) (1954).
79 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. 5 35.302 (1977). See also Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule
for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1951).
80 Delafield v. Barret, 270 N.Y. 43, 44, 200 N.E. 67, 68-69 (1936).
81 See McSwain, supra note 74, at 746.
82 Id. at 742.
83 G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES S 612, at 414 (2d ed. 1960); 3 A.
ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 228, at 1855 (3d ed. 1967).
84 Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARV. L. REv. 603 (1970).
85 See Creed v. McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N.E. 761 (1931); In re Bank of New York v. Spitzer, 35
N.Y.2d 512, 323 N.E.2d 700, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1974); G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, supra note 83, § 708, at
438.
86 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
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needed flexibility in his decision-making process. The modern prudent man
should act as a professional, seeking to improve the return on the assets en-
trusted to him through any "reasonable" means available. Indeed, the profes-
sional trustee is held to a higher standard of skill and knowledge than the or-
dinary investor, and is thereby under a duty to exercise a degree of skill greater
that that of an ordinary man.8 7 Consequently, the manner in which investment
decisions are handled is to be evaluated in the light of that superior skill.88
A professional fiduciary who must maximize return while at the same time
limit risk may find the use of an exchange-traded options strategy extremely
helpful. When a covered options writer writes a call and receives the premium,
the writer is effectively reducing his risk of loss by the amount of the premium
received.8 9 Of course, the writer effectively gives up any opportunity for large
capital gain. On the other hand, he has effectively gained downside protection,
and, if the stock price doesn't rise appreciably over the life of the call, the writer
may continue to hold the underlying security indefinitely. Viewed in perspec-
tive, the effect of writing a covered call may serve to reduce losses, conserve
principal, and increase yield, all of which are desirable ends and lead to the
conclusion that writing such calls may be a* most prudent investment tech-
nique. Similar results can be obtained when put options are utilized, 90 where
purchasing puts may be used, for example, to "lock-in" a current profit on an
underlying security originally purchased at much lower levels.
The new "respectability" of options 91 may be more clearly demonstrated
when considering their use in connection with the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).9 2 ERISA creates a federal "Prudent Man
Rule" that must be considered in the investment of pension fund assets, and
which may be a harbinger of the future. The federal law requires that a
fiduciary discharge his duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enter-
prise of a like character and with like aims. 93 Of course, employee benefit
plans have no conflicts between income beneficiaries and remaindermen, but
the thrust of the legislation is clear: whether an individual investment is pru-
dent is to be determined in light of the nature of the investment and the
character and aims of the plan, all the while employing the above-mentioned
standards.9 4
87 In re Estate of Killey, 326 A.2d 372 (Pa. 1974). See also Estate of Beach, 15 C. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994,
125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975), cert. dnied, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978).
88 326 A.2d 372.
89 This can be shown by a simple example. If our fiduciary bought 100 shares of a $50 stock for a total
cost of $5,000 and then the stock declined to $45, the loss would be $500. If, however, a call option was writ-
ten and the writer received a $500 premium, no actual loss would be felt until the price of the underlying
stock dropped to below $45.
90 See Thayer, Put Options: Heads You Win, Tails You Win, 117 TRUSTS & ESTS. 618 (1978). Thayer goes
even further, stating that failure to properly utilize options in a professional investment program may be
considered, in some circles, "gross incompetence."
91 Thayer, Options Achieve Respectability with Trust Departments, 115 TRUSTS & EsTs. 592 (1976).
92 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
93 Id. S 1104(a)(1)(B).
94 The Department of Labor, it should be noted, is charged with the primary responsibility for enforce-
ment of the Act, and has listed criteria which the fiduciary should consider under 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (1978).
See also Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1979, at 40, col. 1.
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Clearly, however, the prudent man under ERISA is not the same prudent
man as he who deals with his own property. ERISA funds are managed by pro-
fessional fund managers, who are normally more sophisticated in modern in-
vestment techniques than the ordinary fiduciary. But a literal interpretation of
the Prudent Man Rule under ERISA provides statutory authority for the in-
vestment professional to utilize the same investment techniques that are also
being used by other experts in the field. 95
Although there is authority to the effect that Congress expects the courts to
"interpret the (Federal) Prudent Man Rule-bearing in mind the special
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans," ' 96 it seems desirable that in-
dividual and professional trustees should also have the flexibility in their invest-
ment decisions that Harvard College v. Amory intended. If pension fund managers
can prudently invest in options and other sophisticated investment vehicles, it
is arguably unrealistic to prevent an individual trustee from doing the same. If
the trustee does not possess the necessary expertise, he can acquire that exper-
tise easily enough from traditional sources. If covered call writing and other op-
tions transactions can be sanctioned by government regulators who are en-
trusted with the protection of the public, 97 it is eminently reasonable to suppose
that exchange-listed options trading is less of a speculation and more of an in-
vestment "tool" than many courts and trustees might believe. Therefore,
responsible options trading should be available to all fiduciaries, regardless of
the amount or source of the assets entrusted to them.
IX. The Impact of Options Trading on Trading in Underlying Stocks
Options trading is a manner of speculation on the stability of the stock
market. The question thus naturally arises as to what effect exchange-traded
options have (or will have) on the market for the underlying stock. This section
will deal with some of the questions raised by commentators, principally those
dealing with the possible effects of exchange options trading on the trading
volume and price volatility of equity securities.
Early studies dealing with the general relationships between exchange-
traded options and their underlying stocks have been largely inconclusive. 98
Beyond an accepted theory that listed options have resulted in an improvement
in the liquidity of the stock market, 99 such studies, based primarily in the area
95 For a general discussion of fiduciary limits under ERISA, see Klevan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under
ERISA's Prudent Man Rule: What Are The Guideposts?, 44J. TAX. 152 (1976).
96 See S. REP. No. 93-1090, 93d Gong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974).
97 Besides the federal government under ERISA, many states now permit trading in options by in-
surance companies, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. For a listing of various state authorities
which specifically permit such trading, see American Stock Exchange, Options for Institutions: Insurance
Companies and Mutual Funds (1978).
98 See, e.g., Schlanger, Price Fluctuations: CBOE Options Related to Underlying NYSE Stocks, 4 HOFSTRA
UNIV. Y.B. OF Bus. 171-92 (1977); Schwartz, The Theory and Application of Securities Options (1973).
Later studies indicate that the reason these earlier investigations bore so little fruit is that they attempted to
analyze the flow of funds into and out of options, which was an impossible task at such an early stage. See S.
ROBBINS, R. STOBAUGH, S. STERLING, & T. HOWE, infra note 126, at 70.
99 "Liquidity," as used in this instance, is a measure of the average amount by which a buy or sell
order pushes the price of a stock up or down. As an example, assume a brokerage house is asked to bid on a
block of stock. To the extent that the house can write call options against that block, the risk is reduced and
the price offered the seller may increase. This ability to "lay off" all or part ofthe risk is important, because
any appreciable reallocation of risk has the effect of improving overall market liquidity and efficiency.
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of statistical analysis rather than investments, have been a disappointment. An
improvement in liquidity, however, may provide something that portfolio
managers have been seeking for many years: an ability to "smooth-out" the
risks of market fluctuations. An institutional manager (or an individual in-
vestor) who writes options may therefore be able to reduce the volatility of his
portfolio without the necessity of selling securities or otherwise repositioning
equity into debt.
Implicit in this concept of reduced volatility is the idea that exchange op-
tions trading does indeed stabilize the risks of market fluctuations. One of the
earliest studies in this area was that commissioned by the Chicago Board of
Trade in 1969, relating to the feasibility and merits of national options ex-
change.100 That study concluded that exchange trading in options would be
more likely to stabilize, rather than destabilize, the capital markets, thereby
reducing risk and enhancing investment opportunities for both buyers and
sellers.1 01
Shortly after the commencement of options trading on the CBOE, the
CBOE again prepared an economic evaluation of the options market, utilizing
approximately nine months of data. The new study 0 2 concluded that (1) the
market for underlying stocks had not been adversely affected by the trading of
exchange-listed call options, (2) total trading volume in underlying stocks in
the period after the start of CBOE operations was not significantly different
from trading volume before the CBOE, (3) the liquidity of underlying stocks
improved and volatility diminished, and (4) markets for low-priced securities
had not been adversely affected, nor had the new issue market suffered
substantially. 103
Additionally, while CBOE premiums were initially overvalued in relation
to their "intrinsic" value,10 4 with the rapid increase in volume experienced on
the CBOE those premiums have since declined to a more realistic price struc-
ture. 0 5 Of course, under established supply and demand theory, an increased
supply of options will clearly benefit the buyer, who will be able to purchase
such options more cheaply, and thus (if it is desired) enjoy the benefits of a debt
portfolio coupled with the appreciation potential of equity securities. 0 6 If the
investor places most of his assets in fixed income securities and purchases op-
tions with the remainder (or with the interest payments), he may protect
himself from loss of capital (inflation excepted) while at the same time being
able to participate in equity market appreciation. Therefore, the ability to pur-
chase inexpensive options may be a stimulus that will bring the small investor
back into the stock market.
100 1969 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 17.
101 Id.
102 R.R. NATHAN ASSOCIATES, INC., REVIEW OF INITIAL TRADING EXPERIENCE AT THE CHICAGO BOARD
OPTIONS EXCHANGE (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 NATHAN STUDY].
103 Id. at xv-xx.
104 Id. at 33. See also Scholes, Rational Options Pricing and Price Movements on the CBOE, reprinted in
1974 NATHAN STUDY, Supra note 102, App. B.
105 E.g., during the two-day trading period of Apr. 14-16, 1978, the NYSE alone traded a total of over
100 million shares. Much of the volume was due to institutional "covering" of naked call options, at least
according to one source. Wall St. J., April 19, 1978, at 1, col. 6. See also 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102,
at xxviii.
106 See, e.g., Nehl, Evaluating CBOE Option Prices, COMMODITIES MAGAZINE, May 1974, at 45.
[Vol. 55:7] OPTIONS
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Perhaps the most important public policy concern with respect to listed
options relates to the possibility that trading activity in options might divert
funds away from investment in the underlying stock itself, with the result that
lower trading volume would naturally lead to higher price volatility and illiquid
markets in those underlying stocks. "Volatility" reflects the changes in the
price of a stock, and several studies have shown that, compared to a random
sample of other similar stocks, proportionally fewer optioned stocks were more
volatile after the beginning of exchange-listed options trading than before.10 7
Additionally, relative to the market as a whole, nearly all the optioned stocks
were less volatile since inception of options trading than they had been
before.10 8
The initial study'0 9 determined that the volatility of the New York stock
market itself had increased substantially since the inception of options trading
when compared with the market before the OBOE. The volatility of optioned
stocks also rose during this period, but for almost all of the optioned stocks the
rise in volatility was significantly less than the rise for the overall market."10 It
should also be noted that the optioned stocks involved in this study possessed a
greater than average risk factor than the stock market as a whole," 1 thereby
leading to the conclusion that the options market contributed in some measure
to the greater relative stability of the prices of the underlying stocks."12
Later analyses confirmed this conclusion. A 1975 study" 3 found that, dur-
ing market rallies, CBOE underlying stocks exhibited the same pattern of
behavior as random samplings of other NYSE issues, but also determined that
the relative volatility of CBOE underlying stocks was lower, on average, than it
had been in the pre-options trading periods."14 This suggested that there was a
clearly demonstrated diminution of volatility relative to the market among
CBOE underlying stocks as compared to other NYSE stocks."' A later ex-
amination, covering periods of extreme market fluctuations, confirmed that
optioned underlying stocks were not more volatile than the market, even dur-
ing sharp price swings.t"6
Although it is clear that interactions do exist between stock prices and op-
tions activity, as options prices are determined by price fluctuations in the
underlying security, the reported data suggests that such price changes reduce
price volatility and thereby improve liquidity in the securities in question. Ex-
ercise, however, may have produced a different effect on underlying stocks,
107 See 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102, at 45. See also Chicago Board Options Exchange, Analysis of
Volume and Price Patterns in Stocks Underlying CBOE Options from Dec. 30, 1974, to Apr. 30, 1975,
14-17 (July 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 CBOE Study]; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Volatility of
CBOE Underlying Stocks 1-3 (April 1978) [hereinafter cited as CBOE Report].
108 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102, at 45.
109 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102.
110 Id. at 64.
111 The risk factor in common stocks is expressed by experts as the "Beta-coefficient," which estimates
the percentage change in the rate of return for any specific stock that has accompanied a 1% change in the
rate of return for the market as a whole. For a discussion of "Beta," see B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK
DOWN WALL STREET 173-75 (1973).
112 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102, at 67.
113 See 1975 OBOE Study, supra note 107.
114 Id. at 17.
115 Id. at 19.
116 CBOE Report, supra note 107, at 7.
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and a further study was undertaken to probe the effects of options exercises.1 1 7
It was determined, as it had been earlier, that price movements in underlying
stocks were not significantly affected during exercise periods (usually occurring
near expiration), 118 neither did the optioned underlying stocks in any way
"lead" the market during market rallies which occurred near exercise
periods.119
In the first month of listed options trading, over 54,000 options contracts
were exchanged. Only four months later, 266,000 contracts were sold. 120
Because option volume had expanded so rapidly and had reached a substantial
level, a public policy question arose whether the dynamic growth in options
trading had been at the expense of the volume of trades in the underlying
securities themselves.
The 1974 Nathan Study121 found no statistical significance between
trading volumes in underlying stocks before and after the commencement of
listed options trading. Investors, had not substituted investments in options for
investments in stocks, insofar as reflected in sales of the underlying stocks
relative to total NYSE volume. 1 22
Later studies have borne out this earlier hypothesis. Even though in-
vestors can realize much greater leverage by purchasing options rather than
underlying stocks, the difference between trading activity in most underlying
stocks during pre- and post-options trading periods was not found to be
statistically significant.123 It was found that only a small percentage of funds ac-
tually goes into an options purchase program, and represents a small amount
of the average investor's holdings. 124
Other possible public policy questions concern the extent to which
exchange-traded options divert funds from low-priced securities or from new
equity issues. Because options can be used to invest small amounts, it is
arguably possible that their leveraged position would attract funds that would
otherwise be invested in low-priced stocks or new issues from small
companies. 125 In view of the fact that the OBOE began operations at the same
time as a decline in the capital markets, a special study126 was commissioned.
The study determined that the trading of options had no appreciable negative
effect upon the market for small new issues. 127 It concluded that small new
issues and options fell into significantly different risk categories and therefore
did not draw on the same "pool" of funds, 128 and that only a minority of op-
117 Chicago Board Options Exchange, Analysis of Volume and Price Patterns in Stocks Underlying
OBOE Options from Dec. 31, 1975, to Jan. 16, 1976 (Feb. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 CBOE Study].
118 Id. at 5-15.
119 Id. at 12.
120 See P. Sarnoff, supra note 22.
121 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102, at 56-57.
122 Id. at 57.
123 See 1975 OBOE Study, supra note 107, at 8; 1976 CBOE Study, supra note 117, at 4.
124 For the week ending Jan. 11, 1974, for example, when options volume represented almost 80% of
the share volume on the NYSE, the dollar amount involved in options trading was only 4% of the dollar
value of the underlying stocks traded on the NYSE. See 1974 NATHAN STUDY, supra note 102, at 22.
125 See, e.g., the comments of former SEC Chairman Roderick Hills, Barron's, August 2, 1976, at 31.
126 S. ROBBINS, R. STORAUGH, S. STERLING, & T. HowE, THE IMPACT OF EXCHANGE-TRADED OPTIONS
ON THE MARKET FOR NEW ISSUES OF COMMON STOCK OF SMALL COMPANIES (1977).
127 Id. at 4, 67.
128 Id. at 73.
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tions purchasers had ever purchased new issues in the past. 2 9 Clearly, options
represented a differentiated product that can be used to reduce risk as well as to
incur it. Therefore, options do not compete on a one-to-one basis with other
"speculative" instruments such as new issues, real estate, or tax shelters.1 30
And, to the extent that options are bought in connection with risk-avoidance
strategies, the demand is likely to come from investors who would not place
these funds in new issues of small and untested companies in any event.1 31
Options trading markets appear, therefore, to constitute only a negligible
fraction of the billions of dollars invested in new and established securities, and
consequently are of limited significance in the overall supply and demand
equation of the equity capital markets. Even an enlargement of the options
market would not have any significant effect on the cost of capital, or on the de-
mand for equity securities, because the market would still represent only a
minute portion of the total value of the equity markets. If there are public
policy arguments to be made against the options trading markets, they arise
from more established abuses of securities dealings: inside information, price
manipulation, and inadequate supervision of brokers.
X. The Regulatory Climate
Unlike the more established securities markets, the options market is not
directly regulated. Since options began trading on the CBOE, they have
become a significant source of revenue for the securities industry. Despite this
thriving business, or perhaps because of it,132 the SEC has been attempting to
assert more regulatory authority over options trading than has been previously
exercised.
In order to assess the SEC's regulatory authority over the options market,
it is necessary to consider previous regulatory patterns, the pertinent statutory
authority under which the SEC asserts jurisdiction, whether options are
securities, and finally the most recent attempts by the SEC to thwart abuses in
the options market.
In the early part of the century, options were recognized by the NYSE so
that trading could take place on the exchange floor. 133 If an investor desired
more protection in trading at this time, he would most likely trade on the Lon-
don Stock Exchange in the American issue listed there. 134 Years later, during
the great bull markets of the twenties, options often played a central role in
many of the manipulative abuses that were later attacked by the SEC. In fact,
129 Id. at 80-81.
130 Id. at 5.
131 Id.
132 Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
133 Gates, The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor Interest, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 421,
424 (1973). Gates points out that states differed in their attitudes about options. Some states considered op-
tions valid contracts while others considered them to be "gaming" contracts and therefore void under state
law. However, if a bona fide intention to deliver on the option existed so that more than a contract "for dif-
ferences" was present, the financially oriented states (like New York) generally upheld options. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Tumbridge, 83 N.Y. 92 (1880); Story v. Salmon, 71 N.Y. 420 (1877). On the other hand, the
midwestern states generally held options to be void even where an intention to deliver existed. See Schneider
v. Turner, 130 Ill. 28, 22 N.E. 497 (1889); Rudolf v. Winters, 7 Neb. 125 (1878).
134 Gates, supra note 133, at 424.
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options came under such intense attack that an early draft of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prohibited options trading entirely. 135 Congress, however,
was persuaded to change its mind, and only manipulative devices were pro-
hibited by the final statute. 13 6 At the same time, options were made subject to
the rulemaking power of the SEC .137
In 1935, after the establishment of the Put and Call Dealer's Association,
Inc.,'138 the SEC proposed rules for the regulation of options trading. The Put
and Call Dealer's Association, however, successfully deterred direct federal
regulation by incorporating the proposals into the bylaws of the Association. 139
But although the SEC never asserted direct regulatory control over the
Association, it closely followed operations through regular weekly reports. 140
The SEC has consistently expressed concern over options trading because of
the "speculative nature" of the transactions. Put and call options contracts, it
was felt, were securities of a most complicated and technical kind, whose in-
tricacies and complex nature are not fully understood even by many persons
engaged in the securities business itself, much less by the average or un-
sophisticated investor.141 The SEC's concern has increased with the expansion
of the options market, and in recent years it has moved to assert more
regulatory authority.
The SEC supports its claim for jurisdiction on sections 9(b) and (c) of the
Exchange Act, 1 42 but litigation has not yet clarified the extent of this rule-
making authority. Section 9(b) prohibits transactions made in violation of SEC
rules by use of any facility of a national securities exchange, while section 9(c)
permits the SEC to regulate options endorsement by stock exchange member
firms. These rules are clearly applicable to options traded on recognized ex-
changes.
The logical starting point, when considering options as securities, is sec-
tion 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.143 Before listed options trading, the SEC
did not recognize options as securities. 144 Subsequent SEC proceedings,
however, clearly demonstrate a change in the SEC's position supporting the in-
clusion of options as securities. 14 5 And, although the SEC would prefer not to
135 S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REc. 2267 (1934).
136 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 9(a), 15 U.S.C. S 78i (1976).
137 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, S 9(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(b) (1976), provides: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to effect, by use of any facility of a national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessayy or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors .... " (emphasis added).
138 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
139 Gates, supra note 133, at 425. See also SEC REPORT, supra note 4, at 100.
140 In addition, the SEC has issued reports on the options market in 1935, 1939, 1944, 1945, and 1961.
The latest such report was issued in early 1979. See text accompanying note 156 infra.
141 See Investment Advisers Act Release No. 228 (Aug. 30, 1968). It should be noted that such com-
ments were, the norm before the presence of a centralized market gave options trading increased respectabili-
ty.
142 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78i(c) (1976).
143 Id. S 77b(1). This section provides:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires (1) the term "security" means any
note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing.
144 See Anderson, Chicago Options, 27 Bus. LAw. 7, 9 (1971)..
145 Gates, supra note 133, at 437.
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distinguish puts and calls when defining options, that distinction has been
recognized. 1
46
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act 147 and section 3(a)(10) 148 of the Exchange
Act include a "right to subscribe to or purchase" a security within the defini-
tion of a "security." This language would clearly encompass the call option,
which is actually a short-term "right" to purchase a security, 149 and the inclu-
sion of call options as securities is even more compelling when one considers
the relationship between the call option and its underlying security, because
the option holder's financial success is determined by the activity of the
underlying stock. The options investor is therefore clearly in the passive role
which has classically resulted in SEC protection.15 0
Put options are more difficult to classify. The SEC refers to rule 3a 11-1151
to support its inclusion of put options as securities, where puts are part of the
definition of equity securities "for the purposes of clarity." 152 Although section
2(1), which defines a security, does not include a "right to sell," commentators
note that the recent history of options trading, the tone of investment literature,
and the general attitude of investors supplies sufficient support for classifying
puts as "instruments known as securities."' 15 3
Policy reasons also support the classification of puts and calls as securities.
The options market has become a significant source of revenue for the
securities industry, and recent events have shown that self-regulatory pro-
cedures have been abused. 15 4 The investor arguably needs the protection of the
SEC. And, while the SEC makes no attempt to usurp the self-regulatory power
of the exchanges, it clearly envisions a more active supervisory role for itself in
options trading situations. 5
The purpose of SEC regulations is to protect investors. Recently, the SEC
expressed concern about abuses inherent in an unregulated options market,
and as a result, imposed a moratorium on the listing of any new options on any
national exchange. While this moratorium continued, the SEC issued a staff
study that identified abuses and recommended improvements in the regulation
146 See Vogel-Lorber, Inc. v. Options on Shares, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
147 15 U.S.C. 5 77(b)(1) (1976).
148 Id. § 78c(a)(10).
149 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also SEC Interpretive Letter, Dean Witter &
Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,602 (1971).
150 When a purchaser is in a passive role in the investment process, the SEC usually finds a security to be
present. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946), the Court articulated the classic defini-
tion of a security as a situation where "a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to ex-
pect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in
the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests .... " The Court went on to say
that the definition is capable of broad adaptation "to meet the countless and variable schemes devised" by
others.
151 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1979).
152 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,196.
153 See Gates, supra note 133, at 437; 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGuLATION 469 (2d ed. 1961).
154 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,178.
155 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10552 (Dec. 13, 1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,604. See also Flint, The SEC and FRB Treatment of Options: Experiment inMarket Regulation,
53 TEX. L. REv. 1243, 1250 (1975).
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and trading of options. 156 In general, the study called for significant im-
provements in the way exchanges police options trading, and urged tougher
controls by exchanges and their member firms on options sales practices.15 7
The SEC Study, in effect, provides a blueprint for lifting the moratorium, but
it also provides an indication that the SEC will exert more influence over op-
tions trading than it has in the past.
Maintaining the scheme of self regulation contained in the Exchange Act,
the SEC requested each self-regulatory organization on which options are
presently traded or which has proposed to initiate a program of options
trading, to cooperate with the SEC in order to implement the recommenda-
tions contained in the Study.158 The SEC announced that the moratorium was
in effect and would continue in effect until the steps outlined had been com-
pleted.1 59 And although the SEC requested voluntary compliance with its
recommendations, it also asserted that without an acceptable response the
moratorium would not be lifted. 160
Thus, it is clear that the SEC has statutory authority and jurisdiction over
options trading, and is currently taking a more active role in regulation. And as
it is also clear that rule IOb-5' 6t applies to options,1 62 it remains to be seen how
the SEC and the courts will treat other securities law violations. The public in-
terest in requiring SEC intervention is one indicator of direction; arguably, the
full range of SEC powers will be brought to bear upon the industry if trading
abuses continue, while the full range of investor rights should be available in
the legal arena, whether the investor deals in puts, calls, or some combination
of the two. The SEC, clearly, is presently attempting to create an atmosphere
of adequate investor protection while issuing reasonable restraints upon a
reborn investment community, by insuring that the public is served by sales
personnel who are trained and competent and who are supported by self-
regulation.
XI. Conclusion
The study of options and its use as an investment strategy is a full-time
156 Report of the Special Study of the Option Market (Feb. 15, 1979), [Current] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,945 [hereinafter cited as Options Study].
157 Wall St. J., Feb. 16, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
158 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15575 (Feb. 22, 1979), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,962.
159 Id. The recommendations included, first, that self-regulatory organizations should amend their op-
tions rules to provide a standard options information form which requires that broker-dealers obtain and
record sufficient information to support a suitability determination and to insure that firms have recorded
information on which to base account approval; second, the self-regulatory organizations should amend
their options account opening rules to require that the management of each firm send to every new options
customer a copy of the suitability form; third, the self-regulatory organizations should confirm the suitabili-
ty information at least semiannually; fourth, self-regulatory organizations should prohibit a broker-dealer
from recommending options positions unless he has a reasonable basis for believing that the customer can
evaluate the risks and is financially able to bear those risks; and fifth, to require self-regulatory organizations
to prohibit options transactions with any customer who refuses to provide information, and for whom the
firms do not otherwise have independently verified information. See Options Study, supra note 156, ch. V.
Note that there are several other pertinent areas of improvement suggested as well.
160 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15575 (Feb. 22, 1979), [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,962.
161 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1978).
162 The application of rule 10b-5 to call options was sustained in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F.
Supp. at 292.
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proposition. There are numerous variables involved in an options program, in-
cluding an uncertain, but emerging, regulatory climate. The market, however,
is still being developed, and many legal questions are unresolved. For the
knowledgeable investor, fiduciary, or legal advisor, this new and fast-moving
market is both challenging and potentially rewarding. With a new era in in-
vestments comes the need for a new investment device, but as with any invest-
ment, there are risks in proportion to rewards. And although those risks are
slowly being removed through listed trading, legislation, and regulation, one
rule remains: investigation before investment. That rule is most appropriate in
the new and dynamic market of options trading, for the investor, for the
fiduciary, and for the attorney.
